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Abstract
We study the impact of foreign debt on the trade-o¤ between the three open economy objectives of a
central bank international risk sharing, the need to facilitate expenditure-switching, and the incentive
to tilt international prices to lower the labor e¤ort of domestic households  in a two-country DSGE
model with incomplete asset markets and deviations from the purchasing power parity. We nd that at
low debt levels, a Taylor rule outperforms simple targeting rules. However, the central bank can improve
welfare by up to 0.25 percent of consumption via an exchange rate peg when debt-to-GDP ratio reaches
100 percent.
Key words: international risk sharing, foreign debt, exchange rate policy.
JEL classication: E52, F32, F41
1 Introduction
Cross-border ows of nancial capital, which have grown dramatically during the last thirty years, have
been accompanied by pronounced asymmetries in the net foreign asset positions of di¤erent countries. Many
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Asian and Middle Eastern economies have accumulated large quantities of net foreign wealth just as the
United States and most countries in Central and Eastern Europe have seen an increase in their international
liabilities. While cross-country nancial ows bring many benets, such as international consumption risk
sharing and e¢ cient allocation of capital to its most productive uses, they also expose countries to the
risk of nancial crises (through higher risk premia on foreign borrowing and adverse e¤ects of currency
depreciation on the value of existing debt) and may amplify the transmission of foreign shocks to highly
indebted economies. In fact, Mykhaylova and Staveley-OCarroll (2014) demonstrate that high levels of
foreign-currency denominated debt coupled with nancial market incompleteness signicantly lower the
degree of international risk sharing (as measured by the consumption-real exchange rate correlation). In a
follow-up to this nding, we use a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to
explore the welfare implications of exchange rate targeting in the presence of signicant foreign indebtedness.
The literature on the advisability of exchange rate targeting is vast, and its thorough overview is well
beyond the scope of this paper. However, taking the seminal Friedman (1953) paper as the point of departure,
we can trace several shifts in the prescription for the optimal monetary policy conduct. Friedmans (1953)
traditional recommendation, later repeated in Devereux and Engel (2003) and Gali and Monacelli (2005),
was to allow nominal exchange rates to move freely. Country-specic technology shocks require relative
price adjustment to shift international demand to the more plentiful product; when goods prices are sticky,
this expenditure-switching channel must operate through exible exchange rates. In fact, the authors found
that the optimal monetary policy was isomorphic to that of a closed-economy setup: the central bank
should fully stabilize home producer prices. However, the expenditure-switching mechanism needs full and
immediate exchange-rate pass-through to prices and a high degree of import-export elasticity to operate
properly. Devereux and Engel (2003, 2007) observe that if (a) goods prices are sticky in local (country
of destination) rather that producer (country of origin) currency, so that exchange-rate pass-through is
very low, or (b) imports and exports are complements in consumption so that expenditure-switching e¤orts
produce negligible results, then central banks should contemplate some degree of exchange rate stability to
promote international risk sharing. The two objectives optimal exchange rate adjustment and equalization
of international consumptions are frequently in conict, and the optimal degree of exchange rate stability
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depends on specic parameters of the model. The root of this dilemma lies in the dual role of the exchange
rate as a relative price in both the goods and the asset markets.
Central banks are also able to exploit the monopoly power of their domestic producers to improve
consumer welfare, as documented in, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001). As long as home and foreign goods are highly substitutable and international nancial markets are
complete, monetary policy can shift production abroad by improving the terms of trade, thus lowering the
labor disutility of home households while leaving their consumption level una¤ected. This so-called terms-
of-trade externality, therefore, calls for some measure of exchange manipulation, as noted in Benigno and
Benigno (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), and De Paoli (2009, 2009b).
If consumers cannot perfectly risk share internationally, however, exploiting the terms of trade externality
can be welfare-reducing (De Paoli, 2009b; Rabitsch, 2012). In this setting, policies that promote cross-
country consumption equalization gain more importance. Benigno (2009) reports that in the presence of
asymmetries in the net asset positions of di¤erent countries, monetary policy can improve risk sharing via the
debt valuation e¤ects: if the country receiving a positive productivity shock is an international net debtor,
an increase in its consumption can be tempered by a rise in its international liabilities (via depreciation, if
the debt is foreign-currency denominated), thus improving the degree of risk sharing.
This last contribution notwithstanding, the impact of foreign debt on the conduct of central banks remains
relatively unexplored. Our paper continues the study of the question raised by Benigno (2009) to consider
its e¤ect on the degree of international risk-sharing and on the optimal stance of monetary policy.1 In
contrast to the model in Benigno (2009), in which purchasing power parity holds at all times and the debtor
country borrows in its own currency, we model the real exchange rate (RER) dynamics explicitly, so that
valuation e¤ects can directly a¤ect the level of foreign debt. In addition to calculating the optimal weight
on the real exchange rate in the central bank response function, which we model as a Taylor-type rule, we
also rank based on consumer welfare the most commonly studied monetary policies in an open economy
setting: producer price ination targeting (the traditional prescription for a closed economy and for some
fairly restrictive versions of open economy models; dubbed PPI hereafter), consumer price ination targeting
1 In a setup closely related to ours, Demirel (2009) investigates the impact of foreign liabilities on the cross-border transmission
of monetary policy shocks, but does not pursue the question of optimal policy conduct.
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(CPI), and a nominal exchange rate peg (PEG).
Our two-country economy is characterized by sticky prices, incomplete nancial markets, and imperfect
substitutability of goods within and across national borders. These assumptions give rise to all of the three
aforementioned open-economy ine¢ ciencies: expenditure-switching primarily via exchange rate movements
(which we will hereafter refer to as ES), imperfect consumption risk sharing (RS), and the terms-of-trade
externality (TE). The externalities, in turn, generate two tensions when selecting monetary policy: the need
to appreciate (to take advantage of TE) versus depreciate (to o¤set the internal monopoly power), and the
optimality of exchange rate exibility (for ES) versus stability (to improve RS).
One of the key features of the model is the asymmetry in the net international asset positions of the two
countries. Households can trade internationally in only one risk-free nominal bond. One of the two countries
is subject to a risk premium on its external liabilities, denominated in foreign currency. The premium is an
increasing function of the ratio of net foreign debt to GDP (which we refer to as the net foreign debt ratio, or
NFDR), to reect the observation that a countrys borrowing costs are tied to its ability to nance its debt,
a measure that can be captured by the NFDR. Fluctuations in output due to productivity shocks alter the
ratio of foreign debt to GDP and consequently a¤ect the risk premium on foreign borrowing; additionally, the
level of outstanding debt is directly linked to exchange rate movements induced by the shocks. The resulting
valuation e¤ects, as well as changes in the interest payments, can reverse the standard international shock
transmission mechanisms and reduce cross-border consumption correlation. Thus, the presence of foreign
debt has the potential to alter the optimal conduct of monetary policy by changing the relative importance
of its risk-sharing objective.
In this setup, a single central bank cannot simultaneously resolve the above two tensions; therefore, our
exploration of the trade-o¤ between price and exchange rate stabilization is quantitative in nature. We
follow the strategy of many recent papers that use numerical methods to categorize optimal monetary policy
using consumer welfare as the criterion.2 Since the welfare loss function in an open economy setting has
been derived analytically in the papers referenced in the preceding paragraphs, this approach allows us to
evaluate the relative strengths of several well-understood mechanisms that link monetary policy stance to
2See, for example, the works of Kollmann (2004), Cova and Søndergaard (2004), and Wang (2010).
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macroeconomic outcomes in a more complex and arguably more realistic setting.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. In the absence of foreign debt, the degrees of risk
sharing and of expenditure-switching are high and fairly insensitive to the choice of monetary policy regime.
Moreover, there is no tension between the two objectives: following a positive productivity shock in either
country, its producer prices need to fall for both ES (to shift demand to the local good) and RS (to transfer
some of the local wealth abroad). Because of this insensitivity, the central bank can maximize consumer
welfare by exploiting the terms-of-trade externality. In the baseline calibration, the policy that delivers the
most appreciated exchange rate is the Taylor rule with a very low weight on CPI ination and no weight
on the real exchange rate. Even though it requires sacricing a small degree of risk sharing compared to
the other three policy options (PPI, CPI, and PEG), the Taylor rule minimizes the home householdslabor
e¤ort without giving up too much consumption.
The presence of foreign-currency denominated debt changes the relative gains from pursuing the three
open economy objectives by signicantly reducing the degree of risk sharing through amplication of the
wealth transfer. More specically, when NFDR = 1, a currency depreciation following an improvement in
home productivity impoverishes home households via the debt valuation e¤ect, transfers the majority of the
wealth e¤ect abroad, and actually lowers home consumption. To avoid these negative e¤ects, the central
bank of a highly indebted economy should aggressively target exchange rate uctuations by adopting a strict
nominal peg.
Our policy prescriptions are essentially robust to changes in several parameters controlling the open-
economy features of the model: the degree of exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices, import-
export elasticity, and the level of home bias in consumption. The Taylor rule remains the best policy
choice at low debt levels, and the nominal peg delivers the highest consumer welfare with NFDR = 1,
with one exception involving the degree of import-export substitutability.3 When imports and exports are
complements in consumption, the risk-sharing power of RER uctuations is reduced: since consumers cannot
readily substitute towards goods produced abroad, lower demand for imports prevents foreign households
from fully sharing in the home economy windfall, and vice versa. The weakened RS channel reduces the
3Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008), Enders and Müller (2009), and Viani (2010), among others, have documented the
importance of this parameter for the direction of cross-country shock and wealth transmission.
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excessive wealth transfer at high debt levels and makes RER depreciation less detrimental. We nd, under
this particular parameterization, that CPI targeting outperforms the nominal peg by delivering a slightly
more depreciated RER, more risk sharing, and so greater consumer welfare.
These ndings relate our paper to another strand of literature, that on the role of valuation e¤ects in
the dynamics of external positions. In our model, for example, the policy of producer price stability for
NFDR = 1 results in a two percent real exchange rate depreciation following a shock to home technology,
which increases the debt-to-GDP ratio by 20 percent and more than o¤sets the positive income e¤ect of
higher productivity. This echoes the ndings in Blanchard et al. (2005), Gourinchas and Rey (2007), and
Gourinchas (2008) that exchange rate uctuations induce signicant changes in the net foreign asset position
of a country. (These studies remain agnostic as to whether the exchange rate movements behind the valuation
e¤ects were central bank-generated or market-driven.)4
Finally, our paper contributes to the ongoing discussion of monetary policy conduct in developing
economies. A host of empirical evidence indicates that many developing countries, which are typically net
debtors in international nancial markets, do not allow their exchange rates to oat freely; see, among many
others, Fischer (2001), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), and Reinhart (2000). The most commonly
used explanation of this phenomenon is "the fear of oating" argument, proposed by Calvo and Reinhart
(2002). The authors suggest that large currency depreciation may worsen corporate and nancial balance
sheets since many liabilities are denominated in a foreign currency. Within our modeling framework, the
nominal peg does indeed deliver the highest levels of welfare and risk sharing to economies highly indebted
in foreign currencies, as long as imports and exports are substitutes in consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model, and Section 3
describes the mechanisms through which international debt a¤ects international risk sharing. Section 4 lists
the values of the model parameters used in simulations, discusses the resulting business cycle properties
of the main aggregates, and presents the main results of the paper. Robustness exercises are discussed in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the ndings and lists several extensions for future research.
4Ghironi et al. (2015) quantify the relative contributions of valuation and portfolio e¤ects in external adjustment; however,
since in their model all prices are exible, PPP holds, and only equity is traded internationally, changes in a countrys net
foreign assets are not inuenced by exchange rate movements.
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2 The Model
The model, taken directly from Mykhaylova and Staveley-OCarroll (2014), belongs to the class of DSGE
models that are commonly used for evaluating the e¤ects of di¤erent monetary policies in both closed and
open economy settings. Below we outline its most salient features and refer the interested reader to the
original paper for details.
We consider two countries, home (H) and foreign (F ), both of which are populated by innitely lived
households of measure M at home and M abroad; there is no migration. Monopolistically competitive
rms in each country use local labor and capital to produce a continuum of intermediate goods that are then
traded internationally. These goods are aggregated into nontradable nal goods bundles, which are used for
private and public consumption and investment. The model also includes two structural frictions commonly
used in the open economy literature: home bias in consumption and incomplete exchange rate pass-through
to consumer prices. We follow Devereux and Engel (2007) by assuming that intermediate goods are priced
in producer currency, but nal goods available for consumption and composed of both imported and locally
produced intermediates are priced in local currency. Combined with sticky prices, this setup corresponds
to the empirical observation that, in the short-run, exchange rate pass-through into import prices is quite
high while consumer price index (CPI) ination is insulated from exchange rate movements.5 The models
stochastic environment is governed by country-specic productivity shocks.
As a matter of notation, subscripts H and F will refer to a goods country of origin; asterisks will indicate
that it is consumed in country F . For example, CH denotes consumption of country Hs good in country
F . The two economies have a similar structure; therefore, most of the equations will be presented only for
the home country. Since this framework is quite common in the literature, we relegate the model solution
to Appendix A.
2.1 Firms
Each country has a continuum of intermediate goods producers indexed by f on the unit interval. At time
t, each Home producer rents capital Kt 1 (f) from the domestic households at the rate Rt, hires a labor
5See Campa and Goldberg (2005) and Mumtaz, Oomen and Wang (2006) for empirical evidence.
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bundle Lt (f) at the rate Wt and supplies one of the varieties of the domestic intermediate good according
to the standard Cobb-Douglas production function





where 0 <  < 1, and Zt denotes the level of productivity enjoyed by all the home producers at time t.











where int > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the di¤erent varieties.
Each intermediate producer is free to set its own price level PH;t (f) (foreign rms control P F;t (f)),
denominated in local currency; by construction, the Law of One Price holds. As in Calvo (1983), home
and foreign producers reset their prices each period with a constant probability (1   int) and (1   int),
respectively; otherwise, the old prices remain in e¤ect.6
A continuum of monopolistically competitive nal goods rms combine Home and Foreign intermediate
composites into one of the varieties of the Home nal good:


















where  is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign intermediate goods composites, and
0 <  < 1 determines the degree of home bias in consumption. These varieties are aggregated into the










Each period, nal goods producers optimally choose their prices ~Pt, denominated in the local currency, with
probability (1  f ). The price Pt of the composite nal good, which represents the countrys CPI, evolves





6The monopoly power of rms causes them to optimally choose an ine¢ ciently low level of output, a distortion which is
present in most New Keynesian models and can be o¤set by a government subsidy. The availability of such an additional (scal)




There is a continuum of households in the home country, indexed by h on the interval [0;M ]. Each household















Each household supplies a di¤erentiated labor service to all home intermediate goods producers and enjoys
a degree of monopolistic power in setting the wage Wt (h). Wages are sticky, and in any given period a
household resets its wage with the probability (1  w).
Home households have access to two assets: domestically traded, zero net supply state-contingent bonds
Dt (which enable them to perfectly risk-share nationally), and a one-period international zero-net-supply
bond At, denominated in foreign currency with nominal interest rate it . In the presence of the complete set
of Arrow securities Dt, the bond is redundant for the purposes of national risk-sharing; we introduce it to
model the dynamics of international debt. To motivate the need for international borrowing, we assume that
home consumers discount the future more heavily than their foreign counterparts do, so that  < . This
assumption can be supported by appealing to international demographic di¤erences: older countries, such
as Germany or Japan, tend to be net savers, whereas younger countries, such as India or Mexico, typically
have non-zero international debt; see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) for empirical evidence. We furthermore
assume that when borrowing from abroad, home households must pay a risk premium 't, which depends on










The parameter  measures the responsiveness of risk premium to changes in the ratio of home countrys
aggregate international debt level NFDt (dened below) to annualized output (since each period in the
model is calibrated to represent one quarter), and  is a shift parameter that allows us to change the steady-
state value of the debt.7 This parameter can be thought of as a measure of trustworthiness of a country:
7To change the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio, we could alternatively adjust the responsiveness parameter ; however, that
would muddle the comparison of capital ow dynamics across di¤erent calibrations since the cost of international borrowing
would be changing simultaneously with the overall debt level.
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a higher value of  means that the economy can sustain larger levels of foreign debt without having to
pay a higher risk premium. Each home household takes the cost of borrowing 't as exogenous; the risk
premium payments are distributed evenly to foreign households.8 By combining the log-linearized versions
of the households rst order conditions with respect to its asset holdings, we obtain a modied version of
the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition:
it   it = Etst+1 + 't; (7)
which now includes the e¤ect of the home countrys net foreign asset position on the risk premium, and
where it and it are the yields on home and foreign one-period nominal risk-free bonds.
Households pay lump-sum taxes to the government and receive prots of domestic rms. Capital accu-
mulation is subject to quadratic adjustment costs.
2.3 The Government
The above modeling assumptions give rise to a number of distortions. The traditional closed-economy
ine¢ ciencies arise due to sticky prices and monopoly power of rms. The open economy framework adds
to these three more distortions: sticky prices inhibit expenditure switching, incomplete nancial markets
lower the degree of international risk sharing, while imperfect substitutability between home and foreign
goods generates a terms-of-trade externality. The optimal targeting rule of the central bank that wishes
to maximize domestic consumer welfare in the this framework has been well studied in the literature, and
typically includes three quadratic terms: domestic ination (to o¤set the ine¢ cient production allocation due
to sticky prices), the real exchange rate or the terms of trade (to allow for expenditure-switching following
asymmetric productivity shocks and to exploit the terms of trade externality), and output or consumption
gap (to promote complete risk sharing), with the coe¢ cients on each term being given by complex functions
8Other ways of modeling international bonds either assume that countries incur quadratic costs of deviating from an exoge-
nously specied international asset position (Demirel, 2009; Wang, 2010; Rabitsch, 2012), or dene risk premium as a linearly
decreasing function of net foreign wealth while setting  =  (Benigno and Thoenissen, 2008; De Paoli, 2009b; Selaive and
Tuesta, 2003). Both of these approaches are unsatisfactory: the former penalizes countries for repaying their debts, while the
latter can lead to situations in which home consumers can borrow from abroad at lower rates than foreigners themselves can
(when home countrys net foreign wealth improves relative to the steady-state level).
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of the underlying structural parameters of the model.9
Taking this theoretical result as given, we instead focus on simple policy rules in which the interest rate
is set in response to uctuations in ination and/or the real exchange rate.10 Our motivation for doing so is
two-fold. First, the optimal targeting rule may be di¢ cult to implement since it requires policy makers to
monitor unobservable shocks and to estimate the necessary structural parameters of the economy. Second,
we believe that our approach corresponds much closer to the actual practice of modern central banks and
thus is better suited for policy analysis.
As a baseline, we assume that the Home central bank follows a variation of the Taylor rule commonly
used in monetary literature:





Here i = 1  1 is the steady state level of the domestic interest rate, t 
Pt
Pt 1








is the log of the real exchange rate, and the parameters  and q are optimally chosen by the
monetary authority. We assume that persistence in the conduct of monetary policy (i > 0) is a primitive
feature of the economy. In a forward-looking model, higher interest rate persistence means that stabilization
(of ination, output, exchange rate or any other target of the central bank) requires a much smaller movement
of the time-t interest rate, since such movement is expected to prevail far into the future. Lower variability
of interest rates, in turn, implies lower volatility of consumption, output, and labor e¤ort, and thus higher
consumer welfare. This result has been discussed in great detail in Woodford (1999), and has also been
reported more recently by Senay (2008).
In addition to the Taylor rule, we also consider three strict targeting rules that have been widely discussed
in the literature: PPI targeting (traditional prescription for a closed economy and for some fairly restrictive
versions of open economy models), CPI targeting, and a nominal exchange rate peg. We solve the model
9See Benigno (2009), De Paoli (2009), and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) for the details of the derivation of optimal
targeting rules.
10We omit the output gap term because the mandates of many central banks are vague on the importance of output tar-
geting; the European Central Bank, for example, focuses exclusively on short and medium term ination. Additionally, the
computational time of searching over a grid of possible parameter values is signicantly reduced. The real exchange rate term
can be used instead to increase the degree of risk sharing.
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numerically and search for the monetary policy that maximizes the expected utility of home households
given the rest of the models parameter values and the processes for the technology shocks.
Below we focus on the case of a small open economy, in which it is not unreasonable to assume that
the home central bank cannot inuence the behavior of policymakers in large countries.11 Therefore, we do
not address the question of monetary policy cooperation. Instead, we assume that the monetary authority
of the Foreign country credibly targets local CPI ination (so that t = 0 at all times), and look for the
welfare-maximizing rule that can be adopted by the central bank of the Home country.
Finally, to bring the GDP decomposition of the model in line with the data, we assume that government
purchases Gt and Gt account for a fth of total output; both governments balance their budgets every




Equilibrium in the economy is dened by goods and asset market clearing conditions, budget constraints,
and the rst order conditions of home and foreign agents, given the form of monetary and scal policy rules
described above and the stochastic processes for the shocks f"zt g and f"zt g. Solution to the model is found
using perturbation methods described in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Collard and Juillard (2001);
computer code is written in Dynare (Collard and Juillard, 2003). Second order approximations were used
to compute moments, value functions, and impulse response functions presented below.
By combining the aggregate budget constraint of home households with aggregate prots of home rms
and the government constraint GT;t = Tt, we obtain the law of motion for Home countrys nominal interna-
tional liabilities (net foreign debt),
NFDt =
 




 CH;t + IH;t +GH;t  StP F;tM [CF;t + IF;t +GF;t]	 ;
where the rst term measures the current value, inclusive of interest payments, of last periods debt and the
second term represents the balance of trade. Current account balance, CAt, is equal to the trade balance
11The issue of monetary policy cooperation between large interdependent economies has been address in, among others,
Benigno and Benigno (2006), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), and Rabitsch (2012).
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2.5 Measure of National Welfare

















dh measures the aggregate disutility of work. This function will allow us to
make quantiable comparisons of consumer welfare across di¤erent specications of the model. Suppose,
for example, that V 1t and V
2











, respectively. In the case of log utility, the di¤erence between the two value functions,
 = V 1t   V 2t (11)














Expression (10) measures conditional welfare, which depends on the state of the economy at time t.
Following Collard and Juillard (2001) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), we assume that at time t the
economy is in the deterministic steady state and compute second-order approximation of the welfare function.
The alternative approach to policy analysis would be to measure unconditional welfare by integrating out
the initial state of nature. However, as pointed out in Kim et al. (2008), unconditional welfare measure
ignores transitional e¤ects while the economy moves from the initial steady state to the one implied by a
particular policy choice, and therefore can produce spurious performance reversals.12
3 The Impact of Foreign Debt on Consumption Risk Sharing
Mykhaylova and Staveley-OCarroll (2014) show that, in the above setup, high levels of foreign-currency
denominated debt can alter the cross-border transmission of productivity shocks and signicantly lower the
12The arguments of Kim et al. (2008) notwithstanding, we have performed a robustness check by repeating all the exercises
below using unconditional welfare measure. Our results in both the magnitude and the sign of welfare di¤erences remain
virtually unchanged.
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degree of consumption risk sharing between home and foreign households. Once again, we refer the interested
reader to the original paper for the derivations of the transmission mechanisms, and below summarize the
main ndings of the paper.
Under the assumption of complete asset markets, perfect cross-country risk sharing occurs via portfolio
selection regardless of the RER uctuations. When nancial markets are incomplete, home and foreign
households can share risk also via the movement of international prices, as pointed out in Cole and Obstfeld
(1991). More strongly, in our model the only internationally traded asset has non-state-contingent payouts,
which means that the RER movements are the only mechanism of international risk sharing. Consider the
adjustment of the world economy to a temporary increase in Zt, which creates two distinct e¤ects: an increase
in supply due to higher productivity, and an increase in demand for the home good as home consumers become
wealthier. Depending on which of these two e¤ects dominates, the resulting price movement may transfer
the benets of higher home productivity to the foreign consumers (when the RER depreciates) or keep the
benets in the home country (following a RER appreciation). In the absence of international debt and under
most standard calibrations, the supply e¤ect dominates; therefore, in order to shift global demand to the
more plentiful home goods the real exchange rate depreciates. This depreciation transfers a part of the home
wealth e¤ect abroad and causes an increase in foreign consumption and GDP.
Foreign debt works to strengthen the demand e¤ect. We separate the e¤ect of debt on the home economy
into two channels: risk premium and debt valuation. To elucidate the rst channel, we substitute the





into (6) and log-linearize the










Here hats over lowercase letters denote log deviations of variables from their steady state, and bars indicate
steady-state values. The rst term in the parentheses, d̂t, captures the direct impact of the real debt level
on the risk premium.13 The second term shows the e¤ect of terms of trade on the value of existing debt and,
consequently, on the price of foreign borrowing; we describe this channel in more detail below. We dene
13Log-linearizing the model equations gets rid of the convex relationship between the risk premium and foreign debt. Allowing
for a nonlinearity in (12) would work to strengthen our ndings.
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the risk premium (RP) channel as the change in '̂t resulting from movements in home output YH;t.
Due to the presence of original sin, an improvement (deterioration) of the TOT triggers the debt valuation
(DV) channel, as the real value of foreign debt falls (rises), making the home country richer (poorer) and
therefore amplifying (muting) the business cycle:



















Balance of trade e¤ect
:
This last expression comes from substituting the denition of TOT into the log-linearized version of (9).
Following an increase in home output due to a technological improvement, the now lower debt-to-GDP
ratio causes a decline in the risk premium (6). Intertemporal optimization in the face of this lower price
of borrowing causes home households to increase current period consumption. Moreover, since interest
payments on their debt have decreased, the resulting positive income e¤ect causes an increase in the entire
consumption prole, both current and future. The resulting unambiguous increase in current demand works
to (at least partially) reverse the RER depreciation of the standard model. This risk premium mechanism
by itself is not strong enough to completely overcome the e¤ect of the increased supply of the home good
on international prices. However, two additional features of our model original sin and a high level of
foreign debt can strengthen the demand e¤ect. The debt valuation mechanism operates via real exchange
rate movements, which (depending on the magnitude of the home countrys indebtedness) can generate
signicant changes in the international debt burden of the home households.
The combination of these two channels generates a positive feedback loop that works against the baseline
RER depreciation. Once the risk premium channel increases home demand, the RER appreciates relative
to the no-debt scenario. This small improvement in the RER drives down the value of foreign debt, which
leads to a fall in the risk premium, further appreciating the real exchange rate and creating a self-reinforcing
loop. For a very high steady-state NFDR (close to 1), this interaction can overturn the supply e¤ect of
productivity on RER, and the latter actually appreciates. Existence of debt can thus produce a negative
comovement between RER and relative consumptions and therefore lower the degree of cross-country risk
sharing. International price movement not only fails to transfer wealth to foreign households, but instead
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further amplies the e¤ect of the productivity shock on the home economy.
Following an improvement in foreign productivity, the risk premium channel is not operational in the rst
few periods after the shock (since home output does not change on impact); consequently, home consumers
international borrowing constraint remains unchanged. However, the RER appreciation lowers the real
value of the Home countrys outstanding debt through the debt valuation channel; as before, the feedback
mechanism lowers the risk premium on foreign borrowing in response to falling real debt level at home. As the
value of foreign consumersassets declines, some of the foreign wealth e¤ect is transferred to home households.
As a result, home consumption goes up relative to that of foreign households. For very high steady-state
debt levels, we again observe a negative comovement between the RER and the relative consumption C=C.
In the rest of the paper, we turn our attention to the advisability of real exchange rate targeting by the
central bank given the dampening e¤ect of debt on international risk sharing.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy in the Presense of Foreign Debt
4.1 Calibration and Business Cycle Properties
The parameter values used in the model calibration are described in Table 1. Our goal is to calibrate the
model so that its results are not country-specic; however, if the literature suggests a range of values for any
given parameter, we set it to reproduce the average outcomes in Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs), all of which can be classied as small open economies with varying levels of foreign-currency
denominated debt levels.14 To this end, we set the relative country size ratio, M : M, at 1 : 19, based
on the average relative size of these sample economies vis-à-vis EU-27, their main trading partner (as per
statistics in World Trade Organization trade proles). The advantage of using a two-country model rather
than a small open economy framework is the ability of the former to capture non-trivial spillovers between
the two economies, as pointed out in, among others, Mykhaylova (2011). We also perform several robustness
checks to make the results applicable to a wider range of countries. Unless otherwise indicated, all parameters
describing the Foreign economy are identical to the ones in the Home country.
14Appendix B presents a detailed description of the data used in the calibration.
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The rst set of parameters, which are standard in the monetary/business cycle literature, includes the
foreign discount factor ; the relative risk aversion ; the share of capital in production ; and the degree
of price rigidity in the nal goods market f . We set these parameters equal to 0:99, 1, 0:33, and 0:75,
respectively.
The value of Frisch labor elasticity,  1, used in RBC models ranges between 0:13 in, for example,
Christiano et al. (2011), and 1 in Adolfson et al. (2007); however, Canzoneri et al. (2007) nd that its
value does not matter much for the ability of the model to t the data. We take the middle road and set
 1 = 1=3: We set , the home bias parameter, to 0:75 to match the average import-to-GDP ratio of 25
percent. Foreign home bias  is adjusted upward to 0:99, so that imports constitute a smaller share of
foreign consumption. In the absence of this adjustment, foreign country would demand a disproportionately
large share of home country output.15 We follow Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) in setting the trade
elasticity parameter  equal to 1:5. This, in conjunction with the assumed log-utility of consumption, implies
that home and foreign bundles in (3) are substitutes. However, since the dynamics of many key variables
hinge critically on the value of trade elasticity, we check the robustness of our results by also setting  to
values below unity.
We use data from several geographical regions to calibrate the home economy discount factor. In Central
and Eastern European countries (CEECs), the annualized spreads between LIBOR rates and central bank
lending rates range from 0:3 percent for Slovakia to 24:1 percent for Poland during the 19932011 period.
Bouvatier (2007) estimates risk premia on 3-month borrowing rates in several Asian countries to lie in the
35 percent range during the mid-1990s. Elekgad et al. (2006) use Bayesian techniques to nd that an
annual risk premium of at least 8 percent applied to Korean borrowing from abroad during the 19902003
period. Based on this information, we set  = 0:97, resulting in an 8:5 percent annualized spread between the
two model economiessteady-state interest rates.16 The functional form of the risk premium is a modied
15The relationship between the two home biases and the relative country sizes can be expressed as  = 1  (1  )M=M.
16To justify the existence of foreign debt, we can assume that the home economy is either more impatient ( < ) or more
credit-worthy than other countries (captured in our model by the parameter ). Mechanically, we can turn these two channels
on and o¤ independently of one another; in the paper, we assume the more sensible interpretation of debt accumulation due to
the di¤erence in discount factors. However, after checking the robustness of our ndings by letting  = , we nd that the
main results of the paper are virtually una¤ected by this change.
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version of the one used in Christiano et al. (2011) and Eicher et al. (2008). The cost of participating in the
international asset markets, , is set to 2. Given the steady-state interest rates at home and abroad (which,
in turn, are determined by the parameters  and ), setting  = 3 helps us to match the empirical moments
of the current account dynamics in CEECs. In the rest of the paper, we keep the value of  xed and vary
the shifting parameter  (see equation 6) to achieve two di¤erent steady-state debt-to-GDP ratios: 0% and
100%, with the rst calibration roughly corresponding to Albania and Russia, and the last capturing the
macroeconomic conditions, among many others, in Hungary and Iceland during the 20002007 period.17 We
have also tested the intermediate case by setting the debt-to-GDP ratio to 50%, which we omit from the
tables below for space considerations; these results are available from authors upon request.
Empirical estimates such as Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) suggest that
the duration of price stickiness in the nished goods sectors is longer than for intermediate goods producers;
based on the results reported in the second paper, we set int = 0:5, implying a 6-month average duration
of price contracts. As in Devereux and Engel (2007), price markups in both intermediate and nal goods
sectors, int and f , are set to 6, resulting in a 20 percent prot margin. Following Adolfson et al. (2007),
we set the degree of wage stickiness to w = 0:70, and the elasticity of substitution between labor varieties
l = 20.
We set the ratio of government purchases to GDP equal to 20 percent, in line with the data. Calibration
of productivity process is borrowed from Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), with Z11 = Z22 = 0:95,
Z12 = Z21 = 0, V ar ("z) = V ar ("z) = 4:9  10 5, and Cov ("z; "z) = 1:2  10 5. We use the estimates
reported in Wesche (2003) to set the interest rate inertia i = 0:9.
To keep the results widely applicable, we compare the models performance against the range of empirical
moments calculated for several CEECs. The benchmark parameter values result in the following decompo-
sition of steady state GDP (in both countries): consumption share of 62%, investment share of 18% and
government spending share of 20%; the corresponding European averages for the 19802011 period range
between 51%63%, 19%28%, and 18%22%.
17 It is likely that countries with higher levels of debt face steeper interest rate schedules when borrowing in the international
markets. We hold the value of  constant regardless of the NFDR to isolate the e¤ects of foreign borrowing on the transmission
of productivity shocks.
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Business cycle properties of the model for the benchmark calibration are presented in Table 2. The
variances of the simulated variables for NFDR = 0 are somewhat lower than the empirical counterparts,
partly due to the fact that the model dynamics are driven only by productivity shocks; the autocorrelations,
however, fall comfortably in the empirical range. The version of the model with non-zero NFDR is much
better at matching the data.
4.2 Optimal Exchange Rate Policy
We search for parameterization of policy rule (8) that maximizes the expected lifetime utility of domestic
households; more specically, we perform a grid search over [1:1; 3] for  and [0; 2] for q in steps of
0:1.18 We also calculate consumer welfare for the three strict targeting rules: PPI, CPI, and PEG. For
each specication under consideration, we then study the impact of international asset holdings on the
welfare-maximizing choice of the monetary policy rule.
In the version of the model without nominal rigidities (int = f = w = 0), prices adjust immediately
following any shock to achieve desirable levels and compositions of home and foreign output. In this case,
the choice of the exchange rate regime is irrelevant, as argued in Friedman (1953). Indeed, our simulations
indicate that the level of welfare and the degree of risk sharing are virtually independent of the monetary
policy rule. In the rest of the paper we therefore focus on the scenario in which prices and wages are sticky.
Figure 1 summarizes the results of our baseline Taylor rule parameter grid computations; welfare gains/losses




= f1:1; 0g. Further,
panel A of Table 3 compares the performance of the optimal Taylor rule with the other three policy options;
the table reports welfare gains of pursuing a particular monetary rule relative to the policy of complete
domestic price stabilization (PPI targeting). The rst nding that emerges from examining the numbers in
columns (I) suggests that economies with no foreign debt do not benet from real exchange rate stabilization;
on the other hand, central banks of heavily indebted countries can increase their aggregate consumer welfare
by responding to RER uctuations. In countries with no steady state holdings of debt, xing the nominal
exchange rate actually leads to welfare loss equal to 0:1 percent of steady state consumption. However, once
18According to the Taylor principle, the central bank should raise nominal interest rates more than one-for-one in response


















































= f1:1; 0g :
the NFDR increases to 100 percent, strict exchange rate stabilization becomes optimal, improving welfare
by 0:25 percent of consumption.
To understand the forces behind this prescription, it is important to recall the monetary policy objectives
specic to an open economy setting and then to study the impact of foreign indebtedness on their relative
importance in the ultimate choice of the policy regime. Consider the case of a positive shock to home
productivity, shown in Figure 2, and start with the left panel that corresponds to zero steady state debt. On
the one hand, the central bank wants to engineer an exchange rate depreciation to shift the global demand
towards the more plentiful home good (ES). Additionally, a depreciated exchange rate helps to shift some of
the positive wealth e¤ect from the home to the foreign households (RS). On the other hand, an appreciated
domestic currency increases the purchasing power of home households, and can be welfare-improving as long
as they can easily substitute foreign for home goods and thus lower their labor e¤ort (TE). The winning
policy in this tug-of-war depends on the relative magnitudes of these three forces.
Panels B and C of Table 3 compare the degree of risk sharing and of expenditure switching (which we
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measure as the correlation between the relative level of home productivity and the level of its real exchange
rate) obtained under the di¤erent policy regimes. For NFDR = 0, both correlations are very high for all
possible policy rules considered in our paper: the range of risk sharing is given by [0:8825; 0:9669], whereas
the degree of expenditure switching varies between 0:8015 and 0:9977. Since the size of any possible RS and
ES gains from switching policies is small, the central bank can work to increase consumer welfare through
other channels. A RER appreciation generated by following the optimal Taylor rule reduces labor e¤ort
relative to the other three policies and so achieves the highest level of welfare under the baseline parameter
conguration, albeit by sacricing some measure of risk sharing in fact, the lowest value of Corr (C=C; Q)
corresponds to the optimal Taylor rule.

































































Figure 2: Impact of monetary policy choice on the model dynamics following a positive shock to home productivity.




= (1:1; 0) for NFDR = 0, and
(3:0; 2:0) when NFDR = 1. Vertical axis shows percent deviations of variables from their steady-state values.
How does the Taylor rule deliver the necessary RER appreciation? It is useful to compare the corre-
sponding impulse response functions to those produced under PPI. In the latter case, since the home price
of the now more plentiful good is not allowed to adjust, the real exchange rate must depreciate to tilt global
demand to the home products. On the other hand, under the policy of (very loose) CPI targeting, home
prices do decline, although gradually. Instead, the positive wealth e¤ect, experienced by the home consumers,
21
appreciates the real exchange rate and with it the terms of trade.
Following an improvement in foreign productivity (Figure 3), foreign prices should optimally fall, and
the real exchange rate should appreciate from the home countrys perspective (ES). Appreciation also lowers
the work e¤ort of home households, which improves welfare given the very high degree of risk sharing at
low levels of debt (TE). Finally, given the falling home-foreign consumption gap, appreciation also delivers
a high degree of risk sharing (RS) by improving the purchasing power of home households and increasing
the value of their net international assets (notice that appreciation causes NFD to turn negative in the
left panel of Figure 3). Thus, all three policy objectives are aligned, and allowing for full RER exibility
is therefore the best policy prescription (notice from the gure that PPI and Taylor achieve very similar
economic outcomes, whereas CPI and PEG, both of which place more emphasis on real exchange rate control,
deliver a suboptimal response of international prices).
High levels of foreign debt (right panels of Figures 2 and 3) change the relative importance of the risk-
sharing objective by exaggerating the extent of wealth transfer between home and foreign households via
the valuation e¤ect of the RER movement and the corresponding change in the risk premium on foreign
borrowing. The result is a much lower degree of risk sharing under certain monetary policy rules: notice
that the set of possible consumption-RER correlations now covers the [ 0:7722; 0:6390] interval.19 More
specically, an exchange rate depreciation following an improvement in home productivity now carries an
additional cost of signicantly increasing the debt burden of home households. For example, under the policy




= (1:1; 0) the debt-to-GDP ratio
increases to 120 percent, and the degree of risk sharing falls to  0:7120 as most of the wealth e¤ect is
transferred abroad.20 Conversely, a RER appreciation following an increase in Z would disproportionally
19For each model specication, we consider 3 + 21  20 = 423 possible policy choices. Table 3 reports results for only four
of these (including the best of the 420 considered Taylor rules). Thus, the full range of the possible correlations may be wider
than reported in the table.
20An observant reader will notice a discrepancy between the RER response shown in the right panel of Figure 2 (depreciation)
and that described in Section 3 (appreciation). The di¤erence stems from a change in the relative size of the home economy:
M = M = 1 in Mykhaylova and Staveley-OCarroll (2014) versus M = 1 and M = 19 in the present paper. In the SOE
calibration, the foreign CPI is almost completely insulated from uctuations in the price of home country goods. Following
an increase in Zt, a decrease in it is therefore not accompanied by a decrease in it , and the exchange rate unambiguously
22
benet home rather than foreign households through a fall in the foreign indebtedness of the former.

































































Figure 3: Impact of monetary policy choice on the model dynamics following a positive shock to foreign productivity.




= (1:1; 0) for NFDR = 0, and
(3:0; 2:0) when NFDR = 1. Vertical axis shows percent deviations of variables from their steady-state values.
We nd that focusing on the RS objective delivers greater welfare gains when debt is high than pur-
suing the other two open economy ine¢ ciencies. Since improving the degree of risk sharing calls for RER
stabilization, the central bank should aggressively target the exchange rate to reduce the uctuations of the
debt level following both shocks. Our simulations indicate that a policy of strict exchange rate targeting can
improve home consumer welfare by 0:25 percent of steady state consumption.
5 Sensitivity to Open Economy Features
We now examine the robustness of the policy prescriptions in case that (a) the exchange rate pass-through
is perfect, (b) imports and exports are complements, and (c) countries are more open to international trade,
since all these parameters are likely to vary from one economy to another.
depreciates for any given level of the risk premium 't (see the UIP condition 7). Moreover, it can be shown that the e¤ects of
this depreciation on the values of the risk premium and the debt level are positively related to the size of the home bias .
23
5.1 Exchange Rate Pass-Through
The assumption that the retail sector prices imported goods in local currency shields consumers somewhat
from the uctuations in international prices. Insofar as the degree of the exchange rate pass-through governs
the strength of the expenditure-switching mechanism, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at the e¤ects of
nominal rigidities on our results. Below we consider the following four price stickiness structures: (a) fully
exible prices, int = f = 0; (b) int = 0:5, f = 0, which, in the context of our model, is equivalent to
assuming producer (rather than local) currency pricing; (c) int = 0, f = 0:75, corresponding to a simpler
version of local currency pricing; and (d) the baseline specication int = 0:5, f = 0:75. Nominal rigidities
in the foreign economy are modeled symmetrically.
The extent of the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices depends, of course, not only on the
length of wholesale and retail price contracts, but also on the assumed form of the monetary policy response
function. Figure 4 plots the impulse responses of several macroeconomic indicators following an improvement
in home productivity when NFDR = 0 for the three targeting rules. When the central bank stabilizes
producer price ination, the value of int is irrelevant for economic activity. Analogously, the degree of
stickiness f in the retail sector has no impact on the impulse response functions under the policy of CPI
stabilization. Fundamentally, however, economic activity remains qualitatively the same.
Nonetheless, we repeat the baseline simulations under the more standard assumption that price stickiness
exists on the wholesale but not retail level (so that int = 0:5 and f = 0, implying a perfect exchange rate
pass-through). In this calibration, ES and RS mechanisms, which operate through the adjustment of relative
prices, are stronger. With no debt, this increases the tension between ES and RS on the other hand and TE
on the other, which arises following an improvement in home productivity, and therefore diminishes the gains
from generating a RER appreciation and a decrease in labor e¤ort. As reported in columns (II) of Table 3,
welfare gains from switching to the Taylor rule fall from 0:07 to 0:04 percent of consumption. Conversely,
with NFDR = 1, the amplied RS mechanism shifts even more wealth away from the country experiencing
productivity gains, and so further diminishes the degree of consumption risk sharing. Consequently, the gains
from exchange rate stabilization in the high debt scenario increase from 0:25 to 0:32 percent of consumption.
Overall, however, the main conclusions of the previous section remain robust to the change in the degree of
24













































































Figure 4: Impact of price stickiness structure on the model dynamics following a positive shock to home productivity;
NFDR = 0 in all panels. Vertical axis shows percent deviations of variables from their steady-state values.
exchange rate pass-through.
5.2 Import-Export Elasticity
Import-export elasticity  is one of the key parameters governing the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks
across national borders. Before turning to the model results, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at the
welfare e¤ects of the terms of trade externality and its interaction with risk sharing. Under complete markets
(not modeled here), the marginal utilities of home and foreign consumption are directly linked to the real
exchange rate: Ct=Ct = Qt assuming log utility of consumption. If there are no deviations from purchasing
power parity (so that Qt = 1 at all times), this condition strengthens to imply complete equalization of
consumption across countries: Ct = Ct . On the other hand, when nancial markets are incomplete the ratio
of consumptions becomes a function of the real exchange rate and the risk premium: Ct=Ct = f (Qt; 't),
with the functional form depending on the exact specication of market incompleteness. For a given level
of the real exchange appreciation, which lowers domestic output and labor e¤ort and increases purchasing
25
power of home households, the overall change in consumer welfare depends also on (a) the response of home
consumption to the RER movement, and (b) the degree to which home consumers increase their demand for
imports and therefore share the wealth e¤ect with foreign households. In our model, the level of foreign debt
interacts with the value of import-export elasticity to a¤ect the magnitudes of (a) and (b).21 It is therefore
crucial to explore whether our policy recommendations generalize to a wider range of this parameters values.
The answer is generally "yes," with several caveats we explore below.
A decrease in  diminishes the degree of the cross-country wealth transfer following technology shocks.
Using the example of an improvement in home productivity described in the previous section, consider the
response of macroeconomic indicators when we set  = 0:6, shown in Figure 5. Given the lower substi-
tutability of imports and exports, the ES mechanism requires a much sharper depreciation to shift the global
demand to the home good. Additionally, for any given level of RER depreciation, the lower substitutability
weakens the RS channel by keeping a larger share of the positive wealth e¤ect in the home country. Since
home consumers cannot readily substitute towards imports, demand for foreign goods is lower than in the
baseline calibration (with  = 1:5), thereby preventing foreign households from fully sharing in the home
economy windfall. As a result, the range of cross-border risk sharing for all the monetary policy functions
considered in the paper shifts down and expands to [0:3123; 0:7827] (columns (III) of Table 3). Since both
the ES and the RS mechanisms require a more depreciated RER to operate, the tension between them and
the TE objective (which requires an appreciation) is larger, requiring the central bank to carry out a more
careful balancing act of reducing home labor e¤ort versus increasing the degree of risk sharing.
Given our modeling and calibration assumptions, the optimal policy (Taylor rule) takes advantage of the
TOT externality, but now the central bank optimally sets q > 0 to mitigate the risk-sharing gap between the
two countries. More specically, while the RER appreciates for all considered values of q, given  = 1:1,
the consumption-RER correlation increases by 0:1616 when q is increased from 0 to 1:3. In this case, the
central bank improves consumer welfare by about 5 percent of steady state consumption relative to the policy
of PPI targeting. Notice that, once again, the optimal policy does not fully maximize risk sharing; in fact,
21The relationship between import-export elasticity, TOT externality, and the structure of international nancial markets
has been explored in De Paoli (2009, 2009b) and Rabitsch (2012). The authors, however, do not explicitly quantify changes in
the level of risk sharing and its impact on welfare for di¤erent calibrations and policy specications of their models.
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Figure 5: Impact of monetary policy choice on the model dynamics following a positive shock to home productivity
for  = 0:6. In both panels, we set the Taylor rule parameters to their optimal levels. Vertical axis shows percent
deviations of variables from their steady-state values.
PPI targeting, by allowing for a sharp depreciation, increases the purchasing power of foreign consumers and
thus allows for a slightly higher consumption-RER correlation. However, the risk-sharing loss from switching
to the optimal Taylor rule is fairly small (see Table 3) and is o¤set by a signicant welfare-improving decrease
in home labor e¤ort. The left panel of Figure 6 shows that welfare gains from following the Taylor rule,
which allows the RER to appreciate, are inversely related to the degree of import-export substitutability.
Just as in the baseline case, the addition of foreign debt shifts the range of consumption-RER correlations
even further down: Corr (C=C; Q) now varies from  0:4998 (corresponding to Taylor rule with  = 1:2
and q = 2) to 0:5576 under complete consumer price stability. Once again, the RS objective dominates, and
the home central bank chooses a policy that maximizes international risk sharing; the optimal policy delivers
an improvement in welfare equivalent to 0:08 percent of steady state consumption (again, relative to PPI
targeting). Interestingly, unlike in the analysis above, strict CPI targeting outperforms exchange rate peg in
this regard for values of  of 1:1 and lower (see the right panel of Figure 6). Figure 5 helps to understand this
result. As the value of  declines, more and more of the wealth e¤ect from higher productivity remains in
the home country (since the RS channel is weakened). This, in e¤ect, mitigates the disproportional transfer
27
of wealth to the foreigners and makes RER depreciation less detrimental. CPI targeting delivers more of a
depreciation than does the nominal peg, thus improving risk sharing.





































Figure 6: Welfare gains, measured in percent of steady state consumption, relative to the policy of strict producer
ination targeting (PPI) for di¤erent values of import-export elasticity . "Taylor" refers to the Taylor rule that
maximizes consumer welfare.
Once the value of import-export elasticity increases su¢ ciently to allow RER appreciation to transfer
the wealth e¤ect abroad via a shift in demand to foreign goods, the nominal peg once again becomes more
desirable as it best stabilizes the value of debt and the associated interest payments in the face of business
cycles.
5.3 Trade Openness
As the last two columns of Table 3 demonstrate, our results are qualitatively una¤ected by the degree of
trade openness : responding to RER movements is optimal only in the presence of high foreign debt.
Equations (12) and (13) indicate that the magnitudes of the two debt channels do not depend of the value
of . However, as the home countrys import share increases (corresponding to a lower value of ), the TE
channel becomes more powerful, since a larger share of the basket is produced by foreigners.
In the absence of foreign debt, the degree of international risk sharing remains high under all considered
policy options. Therefore, the gains from the policy that can deliver the most appreciated RER again,
28
Taylor rule with a very loose stance on CPI ination and no response to exchange rates albeit at the cost
of lower risk sharing, increase relative to the benchmark scenario (from 0:07 to 0:14 percent of steady state
consumption). Figure 7 ranks the di¤erent policy options in terms of the welfare gains relative to PPI for
a range of values of the parameter . Conversely, a high level of foreign debt combined with greater trade
openness signicantly lowers the consumption-RER correlation, which now spans the [ 0:9805; 0:5656] range.
The reason for the deterioration of risk sharing lies in the greater desire of home consumers for foreign goods,
exacerbating the transfer of the wealth e¤ect away from the home country. The central bank therefore gives
preference to the policy (a strict peg) that can best stabilize the RER and thereby increase cross-country
risk sharing. For  = 0:5, the welfare gain from deviating from the policy of complete price stability more
than triples to 0:77 percent of consumption relative to the baseline calibration of  = 0:75.



































Figure 7: Welfare gains, measured in percent of steady state consumption, relative to the policy of strict producer
ination targeting (PPI) for di¤erent values of home bias . "Taylor" refers to the Taylor rule that maximizes









= (3; 2) for NFDR = 1.
As  approaches unity (making the home economy an autarky), the gains from exploiting the TOT
externality disappear. Since the share of imports in consumption goes to zero, it is not possible to shift the
disutility of production to the foreign households. All considered policy options, therefore, deliver virtually
the same level of welfare in a closed economy setting.
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6 Conclusion
Prompted by the observation that international nancial imbalances have increased markedly in the last
two decades, we explore the impact of foreign debt on the optimal real exchange rate policy of a small
open economy that faces a risk premium when borrowing from abroad in foreign currency. Foreign debt
a¤ects the functioning of the domestic markets via two channels. The risk premium channel reacts to
changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio and magnies cross-border capital ows following idiosyncratic country
shocks. The debt valuation channel links movements in terms of trade to the real value of debt, which we
assume is denominated in foreign currency. These channels interact with one another to lower the degree of
cross-country risk sharing relative to the specication with no international indebtedness.
Via these two channels, high levels of foreign debt change the relative importance of the three open-
economy objectives of monetary policy: ensuring e¢ cient adjustment of international prices following idio-
syncratic productivity shocks (expenditure-switching mechanism), manipulating terms of trade to lower
domestic labor e¤ort (terms-of-trade externality), and promoting cross-country consumption risk sharing.
We nd that at low debt levels, the degree of risk sharing is little a¤ected by the choice of the monetary policy
regime; the central bank can therefore exploit the terms-of-trade externality to maximize consumer welfare.
In this setting, Taylor rule with very low weight on CPI ination and zero weight on the real exchange rate
delivers the most appreciated real exchange rate. On the other hand, the presence of high levels of foreign
debt signicantly lowers the range of consumption-real exchange rate correlations, making risk sharing the
primary objective of the central bank. Strict exchange rate targeting maximizes welfare by mitigating the
detrimental debt valuation e¤ects on home consumers.
Our results are robust to the degree of trade openness, but are sensitive to the assumed value of the import-
export elasticity, which governs the magnitude and direction of the cross-country wealth transfer following
country-specic shocks. At low values of this parameter, the expenditure-switching e¤ect of exchange rate
uctuations is greatly reduced, preventing the wealth e¤ect of productivity shocks from crossing national
borders. In this scenario, the central bank has a greater incentive to improve consumer risk sharing. At high
debt levels, CPI targeting outperforms the nominal exchange rate peg for values of import-export elasticity
below 1:1. This nding qualies the "fear of oating" argument proposed in by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
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Even in the face of potentially large debt valuation e¤ects produced by exchange rate uctuations, the
desirability of xing the nominal exchange rate depends on the countrys import-export characteristics.
Our quantitative predictions are of course contingent on several simplifying model assumptions. It is likely
that the currency of denomination and the elasticity of the cost of foreign borrowing are not independent
of the debt level or the monetary policy stance, potentially altering the risk premium channel outlined in
our paper. Moreover, international portfolios of borrowing and lending countries are composed of multiple
nancial instruments in addition to bond holdings; therefore, the degree of risk sharing under any given
monetary policy could be di¤erent from that reported in our study, with the corresponding consequences for
the optimal conduct of the central bank. Thus, our results represent a rst step towards a more complex
analysis of the interaction between net foreign asset positions and the choice of monetary policy. Finally,
more attention could be paid to the distinction between private and government borrowing from abroad and





























We consider a symmetric equilibrium in which every rm that gets a chance to reset its prices in period
t will set it to the same value; therefore, optimal prices are not denoted by a rm subscript f . Given the
price-setting behavior of individual rms, the aggregate price index of the composite intermediate good can
be written as





























1 f , and MCFt captures the marginal cost of inputs:
MCFt =
h



































where the last equation presents the aggregate wage level. The scaling factorM
1
1 l is necessary to maintain
the aggregate relationship Lt =
R 1
0
Lt(f)df =MLt(h). Together with the expression Kt =MKt(h) this will
ensure that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Additionally, in the steady state, the
aggregate wage W will equal the individual wage W (h).



























































Here it is the yield on the one-period nominal risk-free bond, which can be easily derived from the set of
state-contingent bonds Dt. Following Cochrane (2001), chapter 3, let p (D) =
X
s
pc (s)D (s) be the price
of a portfolio D of state-contingent bonds; here ss denote states of nature, pc (s) is the price of a bond
that pays one dollar next period contingent on the state s occurring, and D (s) is the number of such claims
in portfolio D. If  (s) is the probability of state s, p (D) =
X
s
 (s) [pc (s) = (s)]D (s) = Et [t;t+1Dt],
where t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor. Now consider a bond that costs 1 dollar in period t and pays
I dollars in all states in t+ 1. We then can write It = 1=E (t;t+1) and let it  ln It.




















Similar to the derivations of the aggregate price level given rmsrst-order conditions, the aggregate wage
level is given by
W 1 lt = (1  w) ~W 1 lt + wW 1 lt 1
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B Data Sources and Description
Unless otherwise indicated, all data are taken from OECD.Stat database and refer to the 1980Q12011Q3
period (or at the earliest available date following 1980). The statistics reported in Table 2 are based on the
data for Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
Pt: Consumer prices, all items, 2005=100
Yt: Gross domestic product, current prices, deated by Pt
Ct: Private nal consumption expenditure, current prices, deated by the Pt
It: Gross xed capital formation, current prices, deated by the Pt
CAt: Current account balance, percent of GDP
Gt: General government nal consumption expenditure, deated by the Pt
t: Ination rate, calculated as log(Pt=Pt 1)
NFWt: Net foreign assets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, EWN II update for the web, August 2009); annual
data for the 19702007 period
Qt: Bank for International Settlements e¤ective real exchange rate index
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 Relative risk aversion 1
 Inverse of Frisch labor elasticity 3
 Consumption home bias (domestic good) 0:75
 Import/export elasticity of substitution 1:5





 Capital share in production 0:33
 Capital depreciation rate 0:025
int; f Elasticity of substitution between goods varieties 6
l Elasticity of substitution between labor varieties 20
int; f ; w Degree of nominal rigidity 0:50; 0:75; 0:70
 Risk premium on intl borrowing/lending 3
i Interest rate inertia in the Taylor Rule 0:9
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
40
Standard Deviations Autocorrelations
Actual Data NFDR = 0 NFDR = 1 Actual Data NFDR = 0 NFDR = 1
GDP [1:84; 9:44] 1:31 2:31 [0:52  0:92] 0:83 0:58
C [0:72; 1:06] 0:63 0:96 [0:60  0:92] 0:82 0:85
I [1:34; 4:01] 3:58 4:97 [0:63  0:92] 0:87 0:81
Q [0:63; 3:12] 0:45 1:41 [0:56  0:76] 0:76 0:77
CA=GDP [1:53; 5:97] 0:03 3:72 [0:50  0:88] 0:66 0:51
Table 2: Moments of the actual and simulated data for di¤erent calibrations of the steady-state net foreign debt
level. All moments are based on the starting values for the Taylor rule parameters: i = 0:90,  = 1:1, and q = 0.
Standard deviations of all variables other than GDP are expressed relative to GDP. Both the actual data and the
simulated series are of quarterly frequency, logged, and HodrickPrescott ltered using the smoothing parameter
 = 1600.
41
(I) Baseline calibration (II) f = 0 (III)  = 0:6 (IV)  = 0:5
NFDR 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Panel A: Welfare gains (relative to PPI)
CPI  0:0372 0:2122  0:0383 0:2774  0:4987 0:0840  0:1350 0:7177
PEG  0:1011 0:2502  0:1016 0:3191  1:2533  0:0512  0:2103 0:7729
Taylor 0:0723  0:1819 0:0407  0:0902 5:3107  0:2023 0:1420  2:3828 
; q

(1:1; 0) (3:0; 2:0) (1:1; 0) (3:0; 2:0) (1:1; 1:3) (3; 0) (1:1; 0) (3:0; 2:0)
Panel B: Corr (C=C; Q)
PPI 0:9313 0:0925 0:9532  0:0345 0:7827 0:5535 0:8626  0:0615
CPI 0:9510 0:4613 0:9510 0:4613 0:4545 0:5576 0:9282 0:4218
PEG 0:9669 0:6390 0:9431 0:6261 0:3123 0:5028 0:9469 0:5656
Taylor 0:8825  0:2471 0:9458  0:0367 0:7497 0:2677 0:7858  0:7468
Panel C: Corr (Z=Z; TOT )
PPI 0:9977 0:5573 0:9988 0:5373 0:9897 0:5752 0:9966 0:3651
CPI 0:9842 0:6738 0:9842 0:6738 0:9646 0:7232 0:9722 0:5327
PEG 0:9574 0:7633 0:9515 0:7482 0:9142 0:7555 0:9561 0:5782
Taylor 0:8015 0:0408 0:9029 0:0601 0:6672 0:1049 0:7850  0:2128
Table 3: Model performance under di¤erent monetary policy rules. Welfare gains are measured in percent of steady
state consumption, relative to the policy of strict producer ination targeting (PPI). Taylor refers to the Taylor rule
that maximizes consumer welfare, with the corresponding optimal parameters specied in the parentheses below the
welfare gains numbers in Panel A.
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